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Many power grid applications rely on the time-
synchronized measurement data collected by phasor 
measurement units (PMUs) and or Merging Units 
(MUs)). The synchronization of data from multiple 
PMUs and MUs relies on the global positioning system 
(GPS) to provide the time reference. The civilian GPS 
receivers used in PMU operate according to the 
publicly available mechanism. Therefore, attackers can 
easily generate false GPS signals with low-cost portable 
devices. During the spoofing attacks, the signal received 
by the PMUs and MUs is arbitrarily modified by the 
attacker without being detected, leading to the 
malfunction of other applications in the power system 
including transmission line protection. In this paper, we 
investigate the effect of GPS spoofing attack on 
transmission line differential protection schemes based 
on PMUs, including the percentage differential method 
and alpha-plane protection method. The mis-operation 
of these relays is observed during GPS spoofing attacks. 
In addition, we propose a quasi-dynamic state-
estimation-based method to detect GPS spoofing 
attacks, identify the affected PMUs, correct the 
compromised data, and enable the continuous and 
reliable operation of the relays. Numerical results show 
that the proposed method detects the GPS spoofing 
successfully and the recovered measurement data 
eliminate the misoperation of line differential 
protection.  
 
1. Introduction  
The Global Positioning System (GPS), is designed 
to provide accurate location and time for various civil 
and military applications around the world. GPS 
receivers calculate the local coordination and time based 
on the signal transmitted from multiple satellites. For 
instance, the Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs) 
network, which is widely used in power grids [1], relies 
on the GPS to produce time-synchronized measurement. 
Most of the PMUs utilize the civilian version of the GPS 
signal[2], which is much less encrypted than the military 
GPS signal. The weakness in the encryption can be 
utilized by malicious attackers to fabricate false signals. 
For example, attackers can change the time reference by 
an attacker-selected offset. The target will receive the 
contaminated signal with a wrong time reference. The 
attacker starts with transmitting a replica of the genuine 
GPS signal. Next, the spoofing signal gradually drifts 
from the genuine signal. Eventually, the attacker can 
control the target without being detected. Reference [3] 
presents a portable civilian GPS spoofer using low-cost 
hardware such as digital signal processors and a 
software-based spoofing module. In addition, the 
spoofer is small enough to be placed near the antenna of 
the victim. Reference[4] presents the outcome of GPS 
spoofing attack generating resonant oscillations in the 
HVDC system. The possible outcome of GPS spoofing 
attacks on PMUs includes the PMU clock offset attack-
researchers [5] formulate an optimization scheme to 
achieve an attack to manipulate the PMU clocks while 
avoiding detection by abrupt or inconsistent changes in 
the signals, regardless of the number of visible satellites.  
PMU applications in power grids include multiple 
aspects[6]–[8]: power system monitoring such as state 
estimation; power system control, such as damping 
electromechanical oscillations; The hardware-in-the-
loop experiment in reference [9] proves that the power 
control functions can be compromised during a GPS 
spoofing attack.  Another application of PMU is power 
system protection, such as transmission line protection 
[10]. One of the line protection schemes is line 
differential protection. Differential protection relies 
heavily on the synchronization of measurement data 
from different locations. There are two methods[11] to 
conduct the synchronization: channel-based and 
external time reference based. The former uses the 
knowledge of time delay in the channel, it is an 
approximate method and performs poorly when the 
channel is not symmetrical. The latter usually use GPS 
in practice. For instance, a pair of PMUs can be placed 
at the terminals of the transmission line, and the sum of 
current phasor measurements are used to detect the 
possible fault inside the line. For a line with low line 
charging, the sum is always close to zero under the 
normal operating state. The GPS spoofing attack, 
however, will alter the phase angle of the current phasor 
and will affect the sum. The line may be tripped by the 





relay even though there is no fault in the line. Therefore, 
the attackers can initiate a misoperation via GPS 
spoofing techniques.  Precision   Time   Protocol   (PTP) 
is able to synchronize the clocks in multiple devices 
inside the substations[12]. The use of PTP does not 
alleviate the effects of a GPS spoofing attack. The use 
of PTP to synchronize different substations long 
distances apart is not practical and cost-prohibitive. 
Another possible outcome of the GPS spoofing attack is 
the shift of frequency measurements in PMUs. 
Researchers[13] propose to detect  GPS  spoofing via 
calculations based on PMU frequency measurements.  
In this paper, we investigate the performance of the 
line differential protection scheme under GPS spoofing 
attacks, including the percentage differential method 
and alpha-plane protection method. GPS spoofing 
attacks with different attack angles are simulated to 
study the possibility of misoperation. We also propose a 
three-phase quasi-dynamic state estimation based 
method[14], [15] to detect GPS spoofing attacks and 
recover the actual measurement data from the 
compromised data. This state-estimation-based method 
work with electrical and mechanical measurements and 
physically based device models to monitor the state of 
the power system. It has the additional capability of 
identifying the compromised PMUs as well as the 
source of the altered timing signals and therefore it is 
useful in containing and repairing the attack. This 
method is proved to be able to detect spoofing attacks 
with high sensitivity. In addition, the estimated state and 
the system model are utilized to recover the actual 
measurement during the spoofing attack. This paper 
aims to illustrate that with the recovered measurements 
data from state estimation, the misoperation of line 
differential protection scheme can be avoided and 
ensure the reliability of the relays. The rest of the paper 
is organized as follows. Section 2 describes how GPS 
spoofing attacks the output of PMUs. Section 3 
introduces the performance of percentage line 
differential protection during GPS spoofing attacks. 
Section 4 describes the effect of the spoofing attack on 
alpha-plane line differential protection. Section 5 
presents the quasi-dynamic state-estimation-based 
algorithm used in the attack detection and mitigation 
method. A numerical example demonstrates that the 
proposed method eliminates relay misoperations. 
Section 6 summarizes the performance of the relays and 
effectiveness of the mitigation method. 
 
2. PMU under GPS Spoofing Attack  
Phasor measurement units collect and stream 
measured phasor values with timestamps. Inside PMUs, 
GPS signals are used as the time reference to 
synchronously sample waveforms and assign the time 
stamp to the output phasors (best performing PMUs 
have a typical accuracy of 1 s ). As mentioned in the 
previous section, the existence of GPS spoofing attacks 
severely reduces the reliability of the GPS signal [16]. 
As a result, the GPS signal received by PMU could be 
contaminated and subject to any modification from the 
attacker. The attack studied in this paper is to delay the 
authentic GPS signal by a specific time delay delayt , 
which is depicted in Figure 1. A sophisticated GPS 
spoofing attack transmits fabricated GPS signals, which 
may appear genuine but will shift the time reference in 
the receiver without being detected. In this case, the time 
shift in the clock of PMU will translate into a phase shift 
in the output phasor. All voltage measurements and 
current measurements that use the spoofed GPS receiver 
will exhibit a delay angle delay . An example of this 
process is shown in Equation (1):  
21 01 22 1( ) ( ) exp( ) ( ) exp( )delay delay
m j jI t I t t I t =  =   (1) 
where 0   is the angular frequency of the system, 
( )21I t are the phasors that would have been computed 
without the assumed GPS spoofing and 21 ( )
mI t are the 
phasors computed with the GPS spoofed signal. 
Two line differential protection schemes are 
discussed and investigated in this paper: percentage 
differential and alpha plane differential. 
 
Figure 1: GPS Spoofing Attack Illustration 
3. Percentage Line Differential Protection 
The introduction of GPS synchronized 
measurements and fiber optic communications greatly 
reduce the complexity of differential protection of 
transmission lines. Specifically, GPS synchronized 
measurements enable the simultaneous measurement of 
voltages and currents at remote terminals of a line. 
These measurements are time-tagged and are 
communicated via fiberoptic to the location of the relay. 
The relay can time align the measurements and perform 
a differential protection function with minimal 
interference from the communication latency. However, 
the GPS spoofing attack will largely reduce the accuracy 
of the time stamp and the misoperation of relays is 
possible. In this section, the percentage line differential 
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protection method is investigated during the GPS 
spoofing attack.  
 
Figure 2: Simplified Line Model 
The operating current opI  and restraining current 
resI  are two key metrics in the percentage differential 
protection, they are calculated as: 




resI i i= +  
The currents 1 2,i i  are the current flowing into the 
transmission line at the two terminals. To derive 
simplified expressions, a simplified transmission line 
model (pi-model) is used as shown in Figure 2. The 
impedance of the line equals r jx+  and the line 
charging is jB . Therefore, the current can be calculated 
as  
( )1/y r jx= +  
( )1 1 2 1
2
B
i y v v j v= − +  
( )2 2 1 2
2
B
i y v v j v= − + ( )1/y r jx= +  
The percentage differential relay will trip if: 
 1op RI K I   (2) 
 AND  2/op resI I K   (3) 
where RI  is the rated current of the transmission line.
1 2,K K  are user-defined constants. 
Assume the target of the GPS spoofing attack is 
substation 2 and the attack angle is s , the current 
measurement at substation 2 becomes  2 2
sji i e
 = .  As a 
result, the operating current and restraining current are 
calculated as: 





I i i y v v e j v j v e




resI i i = +
( ) ( )1 2 1 2 1 2
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2 2 2 2
Sj
B B
y v v j v y v v j v e
 
= − + + − + 
 
( ) ( )1 2 1 2 1 2
1 1
2 2 2 2
res
B B
y v v j v y v v j v I= − + + − + =  
 
3.1 Line charging is minimal 
First, the case with no line charging is studied. If 
0B   (short line), the magnitude of current in the line 
equals rated current, and there is no fault inside the line, 
then: 




= −  
( )( )
( ) ( )
1 2
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The percentage line differential will trip if 
expression (2) and expression (3) are satisfied. 
Expression (2): 




−   
1 12k s k     −  
where ( )21 1acos 1 / 2k K = −  
Expression (3): 




−   
2 22k s k     −  
where ( )22 2arccos 1 / 2k K = − . 
If 1 20.05, 0.2K K= = ,  
then 1 0.05 rad  k = 2, 0.2 radk =  
In this case, if the attack angle is in the range  
0.2 2 0.2s   − , then the percentage line differential 
relay will disconnect the line from the grid even though 
there is no fault. Therefore, the misoperation occurs due 
to the GPS spoofing attack. 
 
3.2 Line charging is not minimal  
If line charging is not minimal, the value of B will 
affect the response of the relay to the attack. In this 
section, the following parameters are used to calculate it 
numerically.  
( )1/ 0.01 0.08y i= +  
2 1.0v =  
0.5
1 2
iv v e=  
( )1 2RI y v v= −  
The value of B changes from 0 to 0.4 (pu). And the 
value of /op RI I   and /op resI I    in terms of s  are shown 
in Figure 3 and Figure 4 correspondingly. The region 
above the threshold (dotted line) corresponds to the 
attack angle that leads to the misoperation of the relay. 
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Figure 3: Percentage Line Differential /op RI I  
 
Figure 4: Percentage Line Differential /op resI I   
Similarly, we can present the results in terms of the 
length of the line l  (km). The parameters used are: 
( ) ( )( )1/  0.025 0.2y l i l= +  
( ) 0.001 B l l=  
( )2 1.0v l =  
( )1 2 )( ) exp 001 *(0.v l lv i l=  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 2RI l y l v l v l= −  
The length of the line changes from 10 km to 410 
km. And the value of /op RI I   and /op resI I    in terms of 
s  are shown in Figure 5 and Figure 6 correspondingly. 
The region above the threshold (dotted line) corresponds 
to the attack angle that leads to the misoperation of the 
relay. It is worth noting that when the differential 
protection is equipped with line charging current 
compensation and the compensation reduces the effect 
of line charging completely, the results in the previous 
section with minimal line charging are applicable.   
 
Figure 5: Percentage Line Differential, /op RI I  
in terms of the length of the line 
 
Figure 6: Percentage Line Differential, /op resI I   
in terms of the length of the line 
4. Alpha-plane Line differential Protection  
Another type of line differential protection is the 
alpha-plane line differential protection. This method is 
based on transmitting the measured current phasor from 
one end of the line to the other and taking the ratio of 
the current phasors at the two ends of the line. For an 
ideal line and neglecting the capacitive current of the 
line, this ratio will be exactly -1.0. If there is an internal 
fault in the line the ratio of the current phasor will be 
different than -1.0. Because of the capacitive current of 
the line, the ratio of the currents will deviate from -1.0. 
Therefore, a region of restraint and this relay will trip if: 
 3/res RI I K  (4) 
 AND  4Ω   (5) 
In which,  




resI i i= +  
RI  is the rated current of the transmission line. 
3K  is a user-defined constant, and 4Ω  is a user-
defined restraint region in the complex plane, which is 




Figure 7: Alpha-plane Characteristics 
 
4.1 Line charging is minimal 
For short lines, 0B  , if there is no internal fault and 
the magnitude of the current is rated current. Then the 
restraining current can be calculated as: 




res res RI i i e i i II
 = + = =+ =  
Therefore the expression (4) will not be affected by 
the GPS spoofing attack. In other words, if there is no 
internal fault, the current flowing through the line is less 
than the rated value RI  and 3 1K  , the condition will 
not be satisfied regardless of the attack angle. 













y v v ei
e




= = = −  → 
−
 
Therefore, this condition will be satisfied if the 
spoofing attack angle is inside the trip region. In 
summary, when there is no fault inside the protected 
line, the misoperation of alpha-plane line differential 
protection due to GPS spoofing attack is unlikely, 
because the value of the expression (4) is not affected. 
 
4.2 Line charging is not minimal  
If B is not minimal, the performance of the alpha-
plane method is studied numerically. The parameters of 
the line and relay are: 
( ) ( )( )1/  0.025 0.2y l i l= +  
( ) 0.001 B l l=  
( )2 1.0v l =  
( )1 2 )( ) exp 001 *(0.v l lv i l=  




 =  
0.3, 3.0in outR R= =  
where l  is the length of the line. 
In Figure 8, the value of /  res RI I  in (4) for the alpha-
plane method is plotted. It is clear that the value of 
/  res RI I is constant when s  varies. Therefore, this 
condition will not be affected by the spoofing attack. 
When there is no internal fault in the line, the 
misoperation due to a GPS spoofing attack is unlikely. 
However, during a through fault this value may exceed 




Figure 8 Value of /  res RI I  in Alpha-plane  
In Figure 9, the points corresponding to    under 
different angles are plotted. Also, the length of the line 
changes from 10km to 410km. The magnitude of     
remains constant and the angle of    varies as s  
changes. For most points with Ω4| |s  ,    is in the 
restraint region. However, line charging will shift the 
angles of the points, and push them clockwise. The 
zoomed-in view is shown in Figure 10. This lead to the 
unsymmetrical behavior for 7 /12  s =   and 
7 /12  s = −  . When 7 /12  s = −  the point 
corresponds to    will enter the trip region. In addition, 
as the length of the line increase, which indicates the 
increase of the line charging, the point will move away 
from the boundary. In other words, for a longer 
transmission line, the effective attack angle leading to 
the relay misoperation is smaller. 
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Figure 9 Value of    in Alpha-plane  
 
 
Figure 10 Value of    in Alpha-plane, near the 
trip region boundaries 
5. GPS Spoofing Attack Detection and 
Recovery  
To reduce the effect of GPS spoofing attack on line 
differential protection schemes, a quasi-dynamic state-
estimation-based method is used to detect the attack. In 
addition, this method can recover the actual PMU 
measurement data from the compromised 
measurements.  
 
5.1 Quasi-Dynamic State Estimation  
The quasi-dynamic state estimation (QDSE) 
algorithm utilizes measurements to obtain an optimal 
estimate of the states of the grid. In this paper, we 
formulate the quasi-dynamic state estimator as an 
unconstrained state estimation problem[14], [15]: 
 



















  (6) 
 
2 )1 Pr( ,P  = −  (7) 
where ( )x t  is the state vector, ( )jz t  is the j th 
measurement value, j  is the standard deviation 
relating to the measurement, and ( )( )jh x t  provides the 
measurement j as a function of the state. Note that in the 
case of QDSE, the function ( )( )jh x t is based on the 
transient model of the power system. The dimension of 
( )x t equals N, including, bus voltage magnitudes, phase 
angles, generator speed, etc. The dimension of ( )z t
equals M, including, voltage phasor measurement, 
current phasor measurement, generator speed 
measurement, virtual measurement, etc. 2  describes 
the consistency between the measurement value and the 
estimation model. ( )2Pr ,   is the Chi-square 
cumulative probability distribution function, and P is 
the confidence level,   is the difference between the 
number of measurements and states (degree of 
freedom).  A low confidence level corresponds to 
inconsistency between measurement value and the 
measurement model. This can be utilized to detect the 
internal fault of the device and bad data in the 
measurements[14].  
To utilize more measurements related to the 
electromechanical dynamics in the system, the quasi-
dynamic state estimation (QDSE) method is proposed.  
The expression  ( )( )jh x t uses the transient model of the 
system resulting in dynamic relationships between 
measurements and states.  For example, the variation of 
mechanical speed and the angle of rotors in generators 
and motors are considered in QDSE. Therefore, the 
proposed method increases the number of 
measurements. In general, more measurements lead to 
increased robustness of the state estimation against 
noise and attacks.  In addition, the quasi-dynamic state 
estimation uses a three-phase model. The incorporation 
of the three-phase model ensures accurate estimation 
results even though when accommodating an 
unbalanced and asymmetric system [17]. The inclusion 
of the transient model enables QDSE to yield more 
accurate results[18], compared with traditional state 
estimation. The well-known 2  test is used to verify the 
performance of state estimation. The 2  value is used 
to calculate the confidence level P. When the confidence 
level P drops below a predefined threshold thP , then the 
inputs of the state estimation are abnormal. The root 
cause is determined by hypothesis testing. The phasor 
measurements in the suspected substation under GPS 
spoofing attack are replaced with magnitude 
measurements. The modified measurements and 
remaining measurements are transmitted to QDSE and 
the confidence level is computed again, and the value is 
P’. A GPS spoofing attack is identified if this hypothesis 
test passes, i.e. ' thP P . The estimated measurements 
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are evaluated without the effect of spoofing attack and 
these recovered measurements are streamed to relays. 
Meanwhile, the attack angle can be revealed through 
another approach: for all phasor measurements coming 
from a group of PMUs that are connected to the same 
GPS clock, we introduce an unknown time shift 
expressed in a phase angle. Each phasor in this group 
becomes: 
m true jA A e =  
The value of the introduced phase angle represents the 
phase shift caused by the GPS spoofing. Note this 
approach introduces one unknown variable for each 
group of PMUs connected to the same GPS clock. In 
general, a GPS attack is local and in most cases there is 
one GPS clock for each substation. Thus the approach 
introduces an additional unknown, one for each 
substation. The state estimation provides the value of 
this unknown and therefore quantifies the attack. 
 
5.2 Numerical Results 
 
Figure 11: Illustrative Test Case  
The quasi-dynamic state estimation method is 
utilized to detect and eliminate the impact of GPS 
spoofing attack on line differential protection. The test 
case used for illustration is shown in Figure 11. All the 
measurements from 4 substations are depicted in the 
figure, including voltage measurement, current 
measurement, and rotor speed measurements. The target 
of the attack is substation 1, therefore all measurements 
captured at substation 1 will be affected, including 
12 13 14, ,I I I  and 1V . The attack angle follows the equation 
(8), where ( )u t  is the unit step function. In practice, 
attackers are likely to ramp up s  to escape abrupt 
change detection so a ramp function is also included. 
The investigated protection zone includes the 
transmission line from substation 1 to substation 2. A 
percentage differential protection scheme is 
implemented with measurement 12I  from substation 1 
and 21I  from substation 2.  
 ( ) ( ) ( )( ) 0.5 0.5 1.5
12
s t u t u t

 = − − − −  (8) 
 
 
Figure 12: Relay Performance under Attack 
The performance of the relay is shown in Figure 12. 
The magnitude and angle of measurement 12 21,
m mI I  are 




i    and 21
m
i− , which are the angle 
of  
12
mI  and ( )21mI−   correspondingly, increases after the 
attack starts. The magnitude of opI  increases as a result. 
Though there is no internal fault of the line, the relay 
issues a trip decision after /op RI I  and /op resI I  exceed 
the threshold.  The misoperation of line differential 
protection due to GPS spoofing attack is verified. 
 
Figure 13: QDSE Results 
To eliminate the impact of GPS spoofing attack on 
the relay, the QDSE method utilizes the measurements 
from all 4 substations and estimates the states of the 
network, including the bus voltages, generator rotor 
angles, etc. Then, estimated measurements are 
generated from the estimated states. 12Î  , for example, is 
the estimated measurements, which can verify the field 
measurement 12 .
mI  The overall distance between 
measurements and field measurements are denoted as 
2  , which is plotted in Figure 13. The increase of 
2  
and decrease of P indicate the discrepancy between 
measurement value and the system model. Since the 
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major discrepancy comes from measurements at 
substation 1, a hypothesis test is conducted with an 
alternative formulation of the QDSE. The complex 
measurements at substation are replaced with magnitude 
only: 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
2 2 2
1 1 1 1 1
2 2 2
12 12 12 12 12
2 2 2
13 13 13 13 13
2 2 2





m m m m m
r i r i
m m m m m
r i r i
m m m m m
r i r i
m m m m m
r i r i
V V V V V
I I I I I
I I I I I






The result of the hypothesis test is shown in Figure 
14. The 
2  value remains low and the confidence level 
is close to 1. Therefore, the cause of the abnormality in 
state estimation is verified and the spoofing attack is 
detected. In addition, the estimated measurements of the 
QDSE are used to recover the affected measurements. 
They are provided for the relay and the performance is 
shown in Figure 15. The value of /op RI I  and /op resI I   
remain minimal and misoperation is avoided. 
 
Figure 14: QDSE Result with Alternative 
Formulation 
 
Figure 15: Relay Performance with Recovered 
Measurements  
In addition, we can enhance the state estimation by 
introducing an additional state to represent the phase 
shift caused by the GPS spoofing.  Therefore, all the 
measurements model corresponding to voltage/current 
measurements in substation 1 are revised as: 
( ( )) ( ( )) exp( )i i sh x t h x t j =  
The solution of the revised QDSE has one addition 
estimation state ˆs  , which is shown in Figure 16. The 
estimated phase shift is highly consistent with the actual 
attack angle. Therefore, the GPS spoofing attack is 
quantified.  
 
Figure 16: QDSE Result with Attack Angle as 
State 
6. Conclusion  
This paper presents the effect of GPS spoofing 
attack on PMU based transmission line differential 
protective relays. The misoperation of the relay is 
observed in percentage line differential protection. If the 
spoofing attack angle is larger than the threshold, which 
is determined by the relay characteristics, the relay will 
trip even though there is no internal fault in the line. 
Therefore, the malicious attacker can substantially 
disturb the normal operation of the power grid. These 
results from numerical simulations can be further 
enhanced with real transmission line parameters and 
system states, which allow protection engineers to 
assess the vulnerability of a particular system to possible 
attacks. The inclusion of negative-sequence and zero-
sequence components will be studied in future work. In 
addition, this paper presents a quasi-dynamic state-
estimation-based method to detect GPS spoofing attacks 
and recover the actual measurements. This method 
utilizes a dynamic model of the system and higher 
redundancy measurements such as three-phase 
measurements, generator speed, virtual measurements, 
etc. The numerical results show that the method can 
detect the attack immediately. This method also enables 
the recovery of corrected measurements, eliminating the 
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